Key takeaways
- The offence came into effect on 1 September 2025 and applies to large organisations meeting two of three tests: more than 250 employees, £36 million turnover or £18 million total assets[1].
- An organisation is liable if an associated person commits a specified fraud intending to benefit it or its clients, unless it had reasonable prevention procedures[1].
- Most law firms are far below the thresholds, but many of their corporate clients are not[2].
- The Home Office guidance is built on six principles, from top-level commitment to monitoring and review[1].
The offence in brief
The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 created a corporate offence of failure to prevent fraud. It came into effect on 1 September 2025, after a period allowed for organisations to develop and implement prevention procedures[1]. An organisation can be criminally liable where an employee, agent, subsidiary or other associated person commits a specified fraud offence intending to benefit the organisation or its clients, and the organisation did not have reasonable fraud prevention procedures in place[1]. It does not need to be shown that senior managers ordered or knew about the fraud[1].
The model will be familiar to anyone who has advised on the failure to prevent bribery offence. Liability is corporate and attaches to a failure of systems, and the main defence is having proportionate, reasonable procedures in place at the time.
Who is in scope
The offence applies to large organisations: incorporated bodies and partnerships that meet two or more of three criteria in the financial year before the fraud[1]:
- more than 250 employees[1];
- more than £36 million turnover[1];
- more than £18 million in total assets[1].
Most of the legal sector falls well below these thresholds. In 2026, 26,745 of the 34,255 UK legal activities enterprises employed four or fewer people, and only 200 employed 250 or more[2]. There are 8,899 SRA-regulated firms in England and Wales[3], and only a small minority of them are likely to be large organisations for these purposes. For most firms, the offence matters mainly because of their clients.
Source: Office for National Statistics, 2026[2]
Show the data
| Employees | Enterprises |
|---|---|
| 0-4 | 26,745 |
| 5-9 | 3,225 |
| 10-19 | 2,085 |
| 20-49 | 1,250 |
| 50-99 | 465 |
| 100-249 | 285 |
| 250+ | 200 |
Associated persons and base offences
An associated person includes employees, agents and subsidiaries, and anyone else providing services for or on behalf of the organisation, judged by reference to all the circumstances[1]. The base fraud offences include fraud by false representation, fraud by abuse of position, false accounting, participation in a fraudulent business, obtaining services dishonestly, fraudulent trading and cheating the public revenue[1].
The guidance makes a point that matters for law firms. External professionals such as lawyers who provide services to an organisation are not generally acting for or on its behalf, so they are not associated persons unless, in the relevant context, they also provide services for or on behalf of the organisation[1]. Where a firm does act on a client's behalf, for example in dealings with third parties, it should consider whether that changes the analysis for the client.
There is also an important exclusion. An organisation is not liable where it is itself the victim or intended victim of the fraud[1].
How it fits with AML and bribery rules
Clients sometimes assume their anti-money laundering or anti-bribery programme already covers this offence. It may help, but it is unlikely to be enough. Anti-money laundering controls focus on the proceeds of crime moving through a business. Anti-bribery procedures focus on payments to win or keep business. The failure to prevent fraud offence focuses on dishonest conduct by people acting for the organisation that is intended to benefit it or its clients, such as misleading sales practices, manipulated accounts or false statements to investors[1].
The practical approach is to reuse what works. The governance, due diligence on third parties, training records and whistleblowing channels built for bribery and money laundering can be extended, but the risk assessment has to be done afresh with fraud in mind. The question it must answer is different: where could someone acting for us be tempted to deceive a customer, an investor or the tax authorities to make us look better or earn more? Sales incentives, revenue targets, product claims and financial reporting are the usual places to start.
The six principles of reasonable procedures
| Principle | What it means in practice | Questions to ask a client |
|---|---|---|
| Top-level commitment | Leadership owns fraud prevention and says so | Who on the board is accountable, and how is it reported? |
| Risk assessment | A documented, dynamic assessment of how associated persons could commit fraud for the organisation's benefit | When was it last updated, and does it cover sales, finance and third parties? |
| Proportionate risk-based prevention procedures | Controls matched to the risks identified | Which controls address the highest-rated risks? |
| Due diligence | Checks on people and businesses who perform services for the organisation | How are agents, distributors and contractors vetted? |
| Communication, including training | Staff understand the policy and how to raise concerns | Who has been trained, and is there a whistleblowing route? |
| Monitoring and review | Procedures are tested and improved over time | What changed after the last incident or review? |
The guidance stresses proportionality. A large organisation with a simple, low-risk business may need lighter procedures than a smaller one with complex sales channels and many agents. What it cannot do is have no procedures and rely on good intentions.
Reasonable procedures in a professional services business
For larger law firms that are in scope, the guidance's principles translate into familiar controls. Top-level commitment means the management board owns the fraud risk assessment and receives reports on it. Risk assessment means asking where fee earners, business development staff or finance teams could be tempted to mislead clients or others to the firm's benefit: inflated time recording, misleading statements about outcomes in marketing, or improper handling of client money to cover a shortfall. Due diligence covers referrers, agents and suppliers who act for the firm. Training should use real scenarios from the firm's own work, and monitoring should test whether the controls are actually used[1].
Many of these controls already exist because of SRA requirements on accurate publicity, client money and supervision. The task is often to document how they work as fraud prevention procedures, fill the gaps, and make sure someone senior reviews them each year.
Fraud risk inside law firms
Even firms outside the offence's scope face fraud risk that a similar framework helps to manage. Payment diversion, impersonation of clients and staff, and fake instructions all target the money law firms hold. In the government's Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2025, 43% of UK businesses reported a breach or attack in the previous 12 months[4]. Phishing was the most common, experienced by 85% of businesses that reported one, followed by impersonation of the organisation in emails or online at 34%[4].
A firm that adopts the six principles for itself, even informally, gains two things: better protection for client money and a credible basis for advising clients on their own procedures.
Advising corporate clients
Confirm whether the client is in scope
Check employees, turnover and total assets for the previous financial year, and consider group structures.
Review the risk assessment
Ask to see the client's fraud risk assessment. If there is none, that is the first gap to close.
Map associated persons
List employees, agents, subsidiaries and contractors who act for or on behalf of the client, and the fraud risks each presents.
Test the controls
Match the main risks to specific controls, such as dual authorisation, sales incentive reviews and supplier checks.
Check training and reporting
Confirm staff know the policy and how to report concerns, and that reports are acted on.
Set a review cycle
Agree when the procedures will be reviewed and what would trigger an earlier review, such as an acquisition or a new market.
Example: a client near the threshold
Example (fictional). A manufacturing client with 240 employees, turnover above the turnover threshold and a growing balance sheet asks whether the offence applies. The commercial team checks the last financial year: it meets the turnover test and, after a recent investment, the total assets test as well. Two of three criteria are met, so the client is in scope even though it has fewer than 250 staff.
The team helps the client prepare a short fraud risk assessment focused on its sales team, which is paid on commission, and on overseas agents. Controls are added for agent onboarding and for reviewing unusual discounts. The board minutes record the commitment, and a review is booked for twelve months later. The work is proportionate and documented, which is what the guidance expects.
Practical points for your own firm
- Check whether your firm, or its group, meets two of the three criteria. Larger firms and those with significant assets in client accounts should check carefully.
- Record a short fraud risk assessment even if you are out of scope: it supports your SRA duties and your insurers' questions.
- Treat payment diversion and impersonation as fraud risks to clients, with controls such as call-back verification of bank details.
- Train staff to recognise fraud attempts that arrive by phone and email, not only those in documents.
For related checks on clients, see sanctions screening for new clients, Companies House identity verification and conflicts of interest under the SRA Codes.
Frequently asked questions
Does the failure to prevent fraud offence apply to small law firms?
Only if they meet two of the three large organisation criteria: more than 250 employees, more than £36 million turnover or more than £18 million total assets. Most firms do not.
Are solicitors associated persons of their clients?
Generally not when they provide services to the client. The guidance says external professionals are associated persons only if they also provide services for or on behalf of the organisation in the relevant context.
What is the defence?
That the organisation had reasonable fraud prevention procedures in place, or that it was reasonable not to have any. The Home Office guidance sets out six principles for designing them.
When did the offence come into force?
On 1 September 2025.
References
Home Office (GOV.UK) (2025). Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023: guidance to organisations on the offence of failure to prevent fraud (opens in a new tab) ↑
Office for National Statistics (2026). UK business: activity, size and location, 2026 (Tables 2, 4, 9 and 17) (opens in a new tab) ↑
Solicitors Regulation Authority (2026). Breakdown of solicitor firms (opens in a new tab) ↑
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (GOV.UK) (2025). Cyber security breaches survey 2025 (opens in a new tab) ↑