Key takeaways
- In the SRA's thematic review, 23 cases at firms it visited saw more than £4m of client money stolen, mostly through email-based deception[1].
- The defence is procedural: bank details exchanged once, at onboarding, through a trusted channel, and never changed by email.
- Completions bunch before deadlines: 165,690 in March 2025 against 56,970 in April[2], and fraudsters exploit that pressure.
- Verify outgoing payments as carefully as incoming ones: seller proceeds and redemption figures are targets too.
- If money goes astray, the first hour matters: call both banks, then Action Fraud, insurers, the SRA and the client.
What Friday afternoon fraud is
Friday afternoon fraud is the name the profession gives to payment diversion around completion. A criminal gains access to, or convincingly imitates, an email conversation between a client and their conveyancer, then sends new bank details at the moment money is about to move. The client transfers their deposit or balance to the fraudster, or the firm sends sale proceeds to an account the seller never owned. Fridays are popular because completions cluster at the end of the week, everyone is under time pressure, and the weekend delays the discovery.
It is the most damaging cyber risk most firms face. The SRA's cyber security thematic review found that 30 of the 40 firms it visited had been targeted, and that 23 of those cases saw a total of more than £4m of client money stolen; £3.6m of that was claimed against insurance and about £400,000 was repaid from firms' own funds[1]. Email modification fraud, phishing and phone-based deception were the most common attacks the review found[1].
Why conveyancing is exposed
Volume and predictability. There were 1,144,580 residential property transactions in the 2025 to 2026 financial year[3], and each one involves several large payments whose timing can be guessed from emails, portals and the property chain. Deadlines intensify the pressure. Completions hit 165,690 in March 2025, ahead of the April 2025 stamp duty changes, then fell to 56,970 in April[2]. In spikes like that, staff are stretched, clients are anxious and a convincing email asking for a quick change of account is more likely to slip through.
Source: HM Revenue & Customs (GOV.UK), 2025[2]
Show the data
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| March 2025 | 165,690 |
| April 2025 | 56,970 |
There is also a trust gap to protect. 94% of consumers are confident their legal provider will keep their money safe[4], and residential conveyancing already accounts for 36% of complaints accepted by the Legal Ombudsman[5]. A diverted deposit damages both.
How the attack usually unfolds
Access or imitation
The fraudster compromises the client's, the firm's or an estate agent's email account through phishing, or registers a lookalike domain with one letter changed.
Watching
They read the conversation quietly, sometimes for weeks, learning names, tone, amounts and the expected completion date.
Interception
Mailbox rules move genuine messages out of sight, so neither side notices the fraudster's emails.
The switch
Shortly before completion, an email arrives from what looks like the firm, saying the client account has changed or is being audited, with new bank details attached.
Urgency
Follow-up emails push for immediate payment to avoid losing the property or incurring penalties.
Discovery
The firm notices the money has not arrived, often hours or days later, by which time it has been moved on.
Controls that stop it
Technology helps, but the controls that actually stop this fraud are procedural and must be followed every time, including when the client is a friend of the partner and the completion is running late.
- Exchange bank details once, at onboarding. Give the firm's client account details in person, in the signed client care letter or through a secure portal, and say they will never change during the matter.
- Never accept a change of bank details by email. Any request to change details, from anyone, triggers a call-back.
- Call back on a number you already hold. Use the number verified at onboarding or the bank's published number, never the number in the email.
- Verify outgoing details at the start. Obtain the seller's account details early, check them against a bank statement and confirm them by phone, rather than waiting until completion day.
- Use confirmation of payee and, for first payments to a new account, consider a small test payment confirmed verbally before sending the balance.
- Require dual authorisation for outgoing payments, with the second person checking the source of the account details, not just the amount.
- Set a cut-off time. Completions that slip past mid-afternoon on a Friday carry over unless a partner approves, so nobody is rushed into a payment.
- Switch on multi-factor authentication for every mailbox and check for unexpected forwarding or deletion rules.
Phone lines matter as much as email. If an AI Employee such as Ava answers some of your calls, its approved intake should never take, confirm or change bank details; any caller asking about payment details is routed straight to a named member of the conveyancing team.
Estate agents, brokers and the rest of the chain
Your firm is only one link. Fraudsters often compromise an estate agent's or mortgage broker's mailbox, because those inboxes contain completion dates, buyer names and solicitors' details for dozens of transactions at once. A message that appears to come from the agent, passing on your new bank details, is just as dangerous as one that appears to come from you.
- Tell agents and brokers you work with that your bank details never change and that they must never forward payment details for you.
- Confirm the other side's client account details through the Law Society's Find a Solicitor listing or the firm's published number, not from email, before sending purchase money.
- Treat any change in the other side's contact details late in a transaction, a new email address or a new case handler, as a prompt to verify by phone.
- When you discover a compromise anywhere in the chain, warn every firm involved immediately so they can pause payments.
A brief call to the other side's conveyancer before sending a large sum, using a number you found independently, costs a few minutes and removes most of the remaining risk.
Words that work
Client care letter: Our bank details are set out below and will not change during your matter. We will never email you to tell you our bank details have changed. If you receive any message asking you to send money to a different account, do not pay. Call us on the number in this letter before sending any money. If you send money to the wrong account because of a fraudulent message, you may lose it.
Email footer: We will never change our bank details by email. Before you transfer money to us, call your case handler on the number in your client care letter to confirm the details.
Call-back script for staff: Thank you. Before I act on that, I am going to call you back on the number we have on file from when we opened your matter. Please keep your phone with you; I will ring within five minutes.
The first hour after a diversion
- Call the sending bank's fraud line immediately and ask it to contact the receiving bank to freeze the funds. Speed matters more than anything else.
- Call the receiving bank's fraud team directly if you know which bank it is.
- Report to Action Fraud and record the crime reference number.
- Notify your professional indemnity insurer and any cyber insurer, following their notification terms.
- Inform the COFA and COLP, who will consider reporting to the SRA promptly.
- Speak to the client by phone, explain what has happened and what you are doing.
- Secure the mailbox: reset passwords, revoke sessions, remove malicious rules and preserve logs.
- Assess the personal data aspects for possible notification to the data protection regulator.
Do not let embarrassment slow this down. Among businesses that reported their most disruptive breach externally, only 9% reported to Action Fraud[6]. A firm that reports promptly gives the banks and police their best chance of recovering funds.
Example: on a Friday at 2.40pm a fictional firm's buyer client calls to say she has just sent her balance to the new account in our email. The conveyancer has sent no such email. Within ten minutes the firm has called the client's bank fraud line, given the receiving account details and the time of transfer, and called the receiving bank. Most of the money is frozen before it moves on. The firm then notifies its insurer, the SRA and Action Fraud, and finds a forwarding rule in the client's personal email account.
Making it stick
Write the rules on one page, train everyone who handles money or speaks to conveyancing clients, and test compliance with occasional internal checks. Review each near miss at the next team meeting. Pair these controls with phishing and email compromise defences, a plan for when fraudsters clone your firm, and the basics in cyber security for small law firms.
Frequently asked questions
Who bears the loss if a client pays a fraudster?
It depends on the facts, including what warnings the firm gave and whether its systems were compromised. Clear warnings, a consistent call-back rule and secure mailboxes are the firm's best protection, practically and legally.
Is a lookalike email domain our problem if our systems were not hacked?
It affects your clients, so yes in practice. Monitor for lookalike domains, warn clients, and report impersonation to the SRA and your bank.
Should we stop using email for conveyancing?
Not necessarily, but never use it to exchange or change bank details. Many firms use secure portals for documents and payment information and keep email for routine updates.
Does confirmation of payee solve the problem?
It helps, by checking that the account name matches, but fraudsters can open accounts in plausible names. Treat it as one layer, not a replacement for call-backs.
References
Solicitors Regulation Authority (2020). Cyber security: a thematic review (opens in a new tab) ↑
HM Revenue & Customs (GOV.UK) (2025). UK monthly property transactions tables (Table 3), March and April 2025 (opens in a new tab) ↑
HM Revenue & Customs (GOV.UK) (2026). UK monthly property transactions tables (Table 3: residential transactions by month), October 2026 release (opens in a new tab) ↑
Legal Services Consumer Panel (2026). How consumers are choosing legal services (Tracker Survey 2026) (opens in a new tab) ↑
Legal Ombudsman (2026). Legal Ombudsman 2025/26 annual complaints data and insight (opens in a new tab) ↑
GOV.UK (DSIT and Home Office) (2026). Cyber security breaches survey 2025/2026 (opens in a new tab) ↑