Key takeaways
- Phishing featured in 88% of cases where businesses identified a breach, far ahead of any other attack type[1].
- The real damage comes after the click: an attacker with mailbox access can read matters, set hidden rules and redirect client payments.
- Check for forwarding and inbox rules, unfamiliar sign-ins and new authentication methods as soon as compromise is suspected.
- If personal data was exposed, the 72-hour clock for notifying the regulator may already be running[2].
- In the SRA's review, 20% of firms visited had never given staff specific cyber security training[3].
Email is where a law firm's risk lives
Email carries instructions, advice, documents, completion statements and bank details. It is also the channel clients most often prefer for progress updates, at 45%[4]. That makes a fee earner's mailbox the most valuable thing an attacker can obtain, and phishing the cheapest way to obtain it.
The government's Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2025/2026 found phishing was experienced by 38% of all businesses in the year, and by 88% of the businesses that identified any breach or attack[1]. Impersonation of the organisation or its staff followed at 28%, with malware at 16% and takeovers of email, website or social media accounts at 5%[1]. The SRA's thematic review identified email modification fraud, phishing and phone-based deception as the most common attacks on firms and their clients[3].
The phishing that targets firms
- Credential harvesting. A message saying a document has been shared, a voicemail is waiting or a mailbox is full, leading to a convincing sign-in page.
- Payment redirection. An invoice or completion message from a supplier, client or another firm with new bank details.
- Partner impersonation. An urgent request, apparently from a senior partner, to make a payment or buy gift cards while they are in court.
- Official-looking notices. Emails claiming to be from a court, HMRC, the SRA or HM Land Registry, with a link or attachment to open urgently.
- Client impersonation. A message from a lookalike address asking for documents to be sent elsewhere or money to be paid out early.
- QR codes and phone follow-ups. A code in an attachment that leads to a fake login, or a call from fake IT support asking for a verification code.
Spotting a phishing email: a checklist for staff
- Is the sender's address exactly right, letter for letter, or just the display name?
- Is it asking me to sign in, open an attachment, scan a code, pay, or change details?
- Is there pressure: urgency, secrecy, a deadline today?
- Is it unexpected, even if it comes from someone I know?
- Does the link, when I hover over it, go to the organisation's real domain?
- If in doubt, have I checked by phone on a number I already hold?
One rule overrides the rest: a sign-in page reached by clicking a link in an email is never the place to enter your password. Go to the service directly, from a bookmark or the app.
Signs a mailbox has been compromised
Attackers who gain access usually try to stay hidden for as long as possible, learning about matters and waiting for a payment. These are the traces they leave:
- Inbox rules that move or delete messages containing words such as bank, payment, completion or invoice, or that send them to an obscure folder.
- Forwarding to an external address that nobody set up.
- Sign-ins from unfamiliar locations, devices or times, visible in the email platform's sign-in log.
- A new authentication method, such as a second authenticator app or phone number, added to the account.
- Sent items you do not recognise, or a sent folder that has been emptied.
- Clients or other firms replying to messages you did not send.
Responding in the first hours
Contain the account
Reset the password, sign the account out of all sessions, and remove any authentication methods the user does not recognise. Do this from a clean device.
Remove the attacker's tools
Delete malicious inbox and forwarding rules, revoke third-party app permissions, and block the sender domains involved.
Preserve the evidence
Export the sign-in and audit logs before they roll over. Your IT provider or insurer's responders will need them.
Protect the money
Identify every live matter with payments due and call those clients and counterparties on known numbers to warn them not to act on recent emails about bank details.
Work out what was seen
Use the audit log to identify which messages and attachments were accessed or sent, and which clients they relate to.
Decide on notifications
Assess the breach for the data protection regulator, where notification is due without undue delay and where feasible within 72 hours[2], and consider SRA reporting, insurers and Action Fraud.
Fix the cause
Find out how the attacker got in and close the gap, usually by enforcing multi-factor authentication and blocking automatic external forwarding.
Controls that make phishing fail
Technology cannot stop every convincing email, but a few controls make a successful click far less damaging. Multi-factor authentication is the most important. In the SRA's review, 25 of the 40 firms visited confirmed two-factor authentication was required for many day-to-day activities[3]; there is no good reason for any firm to be outside that group now.
- Multi-factor authentication on every mailbox, including shared and former staff mailboxes, ideally with phishing-resistant methods for partners and accounts staff.
- A visible tag on emails from outside the firm, so a message claiming to be from a partner but marked external stands out.
- Automatic forwarding to external addresses blocked by default.
- SPF, DKIM and DMARC on your own domain, so criminals cannot easily send email as you.
- A report-phishing button in the email client that sends suspicious messages to IT in one click.
- Alerts for new inbox rules and sign-ins from new countries.
Training completes the picture. The SRA found that eight of the 40 firms it visited, 20%, had never provided specific cyber security training to their staff[3]. Short, regular sessions using real examples of recent attacks work better than an annual lecture. Above all, make it safe to admit a click: the sooner someone says it, the smaller the incident.
Shared mailboxes, leavers and delegates
The mailboxes attackers find easiest are the ones nobody owns. Law firms accumulate them: a general enquiries inbox, a completions inbox, accounts and post-room addresses, and the mailboxes of people who left years ago but were kept open in case a client wrote in. Each one is a way in, and each one is often exempt from the controls applied to named users.
- List every shared and functional mailbox, its owner and who has access, and remove access for anyone who no longer needs it.
- Block direct sign-in to shared mailboxes, so they can only be opened by named users who have multi-factor authentication.
- Close or convert leavers' mailboxes within a set period, with an automatic reply giving the firm's main contact details.
- Review delegate access, such as secretaries with full access to partners' mailboxes, at least twice a year.
- Include shared mailboxes in rule and forwarding alerts, because an attacker who sets a rule there may go unnoticed for months.
These are small administrative tasks, but they remove the quiet corners where a compromise can sit undiscovered until a payment goes astray.
A worked example
Example: a fictional associate in a private client team clicks a shared-document link on a Tuesday and enters her password on a fake sign-in page. Her multi-factor prompt arrives and, distracted, she approves it. On Thursday a beneficiary calls to ask why the firm has changed its bank account. The practice manager checks the account and finds a rule moving any email containing payment into an archive folder, plus sign-ins from abroad. Within an hour the account is secured, the rule removed, the logs exported and the four clients with pending distributions warned by phone. The firm notifies its insurer and the regulator, and changes multi-factor authentication to number matching so that an approval cannot be given without seeing the code on screen.
Client confidence is the reason to rehearse this. 94% of consumers are confident their legal provider will keep their money safe[5]. For payments specifically, read Friday afternoon fraud; for when criminals impersonate you without touching your systems, see cloned law firms; and to tighten sign-in security, see MFA and password policy.
Frequently asked questions
What should a member of staff do straight after clicking a phishing link?
Tell IT or the named contact immediately, even if nothing seems to have happened. If they entered a password, it should be changed from a clean device and the account checked for new rules and sign-ins.
Is a compromised mailbox always a reportable breach?
Not always, but often. If the attacker could access client personal data, assess the risk promptly; notification to the regulator is required unless the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to people.
Does multi-factor authentication stop all phishing?
No. Some attacks trick users into approving prompts or capture session tokens. It still stops the majority of password-only attacks, and number matching or phishing-resistant methods close much of the remaining gap.
Should we run simulated phishing tests?
They can help if used to teach rather than to catch people out. Share results by team, follow up with short training, and celebrate reporting as much as avoiding clicks.
References
GOV.UK (DSIT and Home Office) (2026). Cyber security breaches survey 2025/2026 (opens in a new tab) ↑
legislation.gov.uk (The National Archives) (2016). UK GDPR Article 33: Notification of a personal data breach to the supervisory authority (opens in a new tab) ↑
Solicitors Regulation Authority (2020). Cyber security: a thematic review (opens in a new tab) ↑
Legal Services Consumer Panel (2026). How consumers are using legal services (Tracker Survey 2026) (opens in a new tab) ↑
Legal Services Consumer Panel (2026). How consumers are choosing legal services (Tracker Survey 2026) (opens in a new tab) ↑