Data protection and cyber security

Ransomware response plan for solicitors

A law firm's first 24 hours after ransomware: isolation, evidence, backups, notifications, client communication and the ransom question.

Ava research teamPublished 7 min read

On this page
  1. Why law firms need a written plan
  2. Before it happens: five things to have ready
  3. The first 24 hours
  4. Who does what
  5. The ransom question
  6. Talking to clients and staff
  7. Rehearse it once a year
  8. After recovery
  9. Frequently asked questions
  10. References

Key takeaways

  • Ransomware is rarer than phishing, affecting 1% of businesses in a year, but when it hits it can stop a firm working[1].
  • Only 25% of businesses have a formal incident response plan, and 21% of micro businesses[1].
  • Isolate first, preserve evidence, then restore from backups you have tested; never wipe machines before the investigation starts.
  • Law firms have deadlines that do not pause: court dates, completions, limitation periods and search priority periods need an offline list.
  • Notify the regulator within 72 hours where required[2] and report serious matters to the SRA promptly[3]; the SRA has found ransomware incidents going unreported[4].

Why law firms need a written plan

Ransomware encrypts a firm's files and systems and demands payment for the key, often with a threat to publish stolen data as well. It is less common than phishing: the Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2025/2026 found 1% of businesses experienced ransomware in the year, down from 3% in each of the two previous years, and 2% of businesses that identified a breach said a ransom was paid[1]. But for a law firm the impact is severe. Files, diaries, accounts and email can disappear at once, in the middle of live matters.

The SRA's thematic review described a firm that lost around £150,000 of billable time after a fee earner accidentally started a ransomware attack, and found that five of the seven significant incidents firms had not reported to the SRA were ransomware[4]. Preparation is thin across the economy: only 25% of businesses have a formal incident response plan, falling to 21% of micro businesses[1]. Most firms are micro businesses, with 78% of legal activities enterprises employing four people or fewer[5].

Businesses with a formal incident response planCyber Security Breaches Survey 2025/2026.
Businesses with a formal incident response planColumn chart. Micro: 21%; All businesses: 25%; Medium: 57%; Large: 76%.0%20%40%60%80%Micro: 21%21%MicroAll businesses: 25%25%All businessesMedium: 57%57%MediumLarge: 76%76%LargeBusinesses with a formal incident response planColumn chart. Micro: 21%; All businesses: 25%; Medium: 57%; Large: 76%.0%20%40%60%80%Micro: 21%21%MicroAll businesses: 25%25%Allbusines-sesMedium: 57%57%MediumLarge: 76%76%Large

Source: GOV.UK (DSIT and Home Office), 2026[1]

Show the data
ItemValue
Micro21%
All businesses25%
Medium57%
Large76%

Before it happens: five things to have ready

  1. A one-page response plan, printed and stored offline, with names, mobile numbers and the order of calls: IT provider, insurer's incident line, data protection lead, COLP and COFA, managing partner.
  2. Backups that ransomware cannot reach: at least one copy offline or immutable, with a restore test every quarter and a record of how long it took.
  3. An offline critical dates list, refreshed weekly: hearings, filing deadlines, completions, limitation dates, search priority periods and undertakings due.
  4. Contact details for clients with live urgent matters, held outside the main systems.
  5. Your insurance policies and notification requirements, including any panel of approved incident responders.

Business continuity is the gap most likely to hurt. Only 33% of businesses have a business continuity plan that covers cyber security, and 29% of micro businesses[1]. For a law firm, the critical dates list is the single most valuable part of that plan.

The first 24 hours

  1. Minute 0: isolate

    Disconnect affected machines from the network and the internet by unplugging the cable or turning off wireless. Do not switch them off or wipe them; memory and logs may be needed. Disable remote access.

  2. First hour: call for help

    Call your IT provider and your cyber insurer's incident line. Many policies require you to use their responders and to notify within hours. Start an incident log with times.

  3. Hours 1 to 3: assess scope

    Establish which systems are encrypted, whether email and cloud services are affected, whether backups are intact, and whether there is evidence of data being copied out.

  4. Hours 3 to 6: protect live matters

    Use the offline critical dates list. Contact courts, counterparties and clients for anything due in the next few days; seek adjournments or extensions where needed.

  5. Hours 6 to 12: communicate

    Tell staff what to do and what not to say. Prepare a short holding statement for clients and callers, and a script for reception.

  6. Hours 12 to 24: notify

    Decide on notification to the data protection regulator, which must be made without undue delay and where feasible within 72 hours of awareness if the breach is likely to result in a risk to people[2]. Consider reporting to the SRA, Action Fraud and the NCSC.

  7. Day 2 onwards: recover

    Rebuild from clean images, restore from verified backups, reset all passwords and enforce multi-factor authentication before reconnecting users.

Who does what

Example role allocation for a small or medium firm.
RoleResponsibilities in the incident
Incident lead (usually a partner)Makes decisions, keeps the log, chairs regular check-ins, approves external statements
IT provider or incident responderContainment, investigation, evidence preservation, restoration
Data protection leadBreach assessment, regulator notification, letters to affected individuals
COLP and COFASRA reporting, client money position, regulatory obligations
Heads of departmentCritical dates, client calls, court and counterparty contact
Practice manager or office leadStaff briefings, alternative working arrangements, supplier coordination

The SRA Code requires prompt reporting of facts capable of amounting to a serious breach of its regulatory arrangements, and allows that obligation to be met by passing information to the firm's COLP or COFA[3]. Make sure they are in the room from the start, not told afterwards.

The ransom question

Sooner or later someone will ask whether the firm should pay. Decide in advance who will make that call and on what basis, because the pressure on the day is intense.

  • Paying does not guarantee the key works, that all data is returned or that stolen data will not be published.
  • Payments to sanctioned individuals or groups can be unlawful, and insurers will expect checks before any payment.
  • Law enforcement and the NCSC do not encourage payment, and paying can mark the firm as a willing target.
  • Your duties to clients do not disappear if data is published after payment; notification decisions are unaffected.
  • If backups are intact and tested, the case for paying is usually weak.

Record whatever is decided and why. Regulators and insurers will want to see a reasoned decision, not a panicked one.

Talking to clients and staff

Holding statement for callers: We are dealing with an IT incident that is affecting some of our systems. We are working with specialists and your matter is being looked after. Your solicitor will contact you directly if anything affects your case. Please do not act on any email asking you to send money or change bank details; call us on this number to check.

For staff: do not discuss the incident on social media or with the press, route all external questions to the incident lead, keep a note of any calls from clients, and do not use personal email or cloud accounts to work around the outage. Workarounds created in a hurry are how confidential data ends up in the wrong place.

Rehearse it once a year

A plan nobody has practised tends to fail on small details: the printed contact list is out of date, the insurer's hotline number is in the encrypted system, or nobody knows how to restore the accounts package. A two-hour tabletop exercise each year, run by the incident lead with the IT provider on the call, finds those gaps cheaply.

  1. Set the scene: it is Monday at 8.30am and staff cannot open files; a ransom note is on every screen.
  2. Ask each role to say what they would do in the first hour, using only the printed plan.
  3. Introduce complications: a completion is due tomorrow, a journalist calls, a client says they have received an email from the firm asking for payment.
  4. Check the critical dates list. Is it current, and could you reach every client on it?
  5. Test a restore of a sample of real files and time it.
  6. Write down three improvements, assign owners and dates, and update the plan.

Share a short summary of the exercise with the partners and, if it asks, your insurer. Evidence that you test the plan can count in your favour at renewal, and the improvements it produces are worth more than any document.

After recovery

Hold a debrief within two weeks. Ask how the attacker got in, why detection took as long as it did, whether the backups and critical dates list worked, and which notifications were made on time. Change at least one control as a result and record it.

Example: a fictional eight-person firm finds its file server encrypted on a Monday morning. The practice manager unplugs the network switch, calls the IT provider and the insurer's hotline, and opens the printed critical dates list. Two completions on Wednesday are moved by agreement with the other side, and a court is asked for a short extension for a filing due Tuesday. The insurer's responders find the attacker entered through a remote access account without multi-factor authentication and copied a small number of files. The firm restores from its offline backup by Wednesday, notifies the regulator and the affected clients, reports to the SRA and enforces multi-factor authentication on all remote access.

Ransomware often starts with a phishing email or a weak password, so pair this plan with our guides to phishing and email compromise, MFA and password policy and reporting data breaches.

Frequently asked questions

Is ransomware always a reportable data breach?

Not always, but often. Loss of access to personal data can itself be a breach, and many attacks now copy data before encrypting it. Assess the risk quickly and notify within 72 hours where required.

Should we switch infected computers off?

Disconnect them from the network instead. Switching off can destroy evidence held in memory that investigators need to work out what happened.

Do we have to tell the SRA?

Consider it promptly. A serious incident affecting client data, client money or the firm's ability to act can amount to a matter the SRA expects to hear about, and reports can be made through your COLP or COFA.

How often should we test our backups?

At least quarterly, by actually restoring files and timing the process. A backup that has never been restored is an assumption, not a plan.

References

  1. GOV.UK (DSIT and Home Office) (2026). Cyber security breaches survey 2025/2026 (opens in a new tab) ↑

  2. legislation.gov.uk (The National Archives) (2016). UK GDPR Article 33: Notification of a personal data breach to the supervisory authority (opens in a new tab) ↑

  3. Solicitors Regulation Authority (2025). SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors, RELs, RFLs and RSLs (paragraphs 7.7 and 7.12) (opens in a new tab) ↑

  4. Solicitors Regulation Authority (2020). Cyber security: a thematic review (opens in a new tab) ↑

  5. Office for National Statistics (2026). UK business: activity, size and location, 2026 (legal activities by employment size) (opens in a new tab) ↑

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